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Hyperelliptic curves over ﬁnite ﬁelds are used in cryptosystems. To reach better performance,
Koblitz curves, i.e. subﬁeld curves, have been proposed. We present fast scalar multiplication
methods for Koblitz curve cryptosystems for hyperelliptic curves enhancing the techniques
published so far. For hyperelliptic curves, this paper is the ﬁrst to give a proof on the ﬁniteness
of the Frobenius-expansions involved, to deal with periodic expansions, and to give a sound
complexity estimate.
As a second topic we consider a different, even faster set-up. The idea is to use a -adic
expansion as the key instead of starting with an integer which is then expanded. We show
that this approach has similar security and is especially suited for restricted devices as the
requirements to perform the operations are reduced to a minimum.
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1. Introduction
Many protocols for public key cryptography rely on the use of cyclic groups. In the
Difﬁe–Hellman key exchange as well as in ElGamal’s encryption and signature schemes
the main operation is the computation of m times a group element. Thus a group is
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suitable if this computation is fast, the group order can be determined efﬁciently, and—
most importantly—the discrete logarithm problem, i.e. the problem of obtaining m from
the knowledge of D and E = mD, is hard. Elliptic and hyperelliptic curves provide
suitable groups—there are no currently known subexponential algorithms for solving the
DLP on such curves of genus g3, except for curves of special classes. Furthermore,
fast explicit formulae for addition and doubling exist, making the curves applicable in
practice. The ﬁnite ﬁeld the arithmetic is based on becomes smaller with increasing
genus which might be advantageous for implementations. Compared to the common
choice of the cyclic group as the multiplicative group of a ﬁnite ﬁeld, the size of the
ﬁnite ﬁeld can be chosen much smaller on the cost of more complicated formulae to
do arithmetic in the group.
If speed is an issue, cryptosystems based on curves can be speed-up considerably if
one uses special curves. In this paper we investigate Koblitz curves; these are curves
which are deﬁned over a small ﬁnite ﬁeld and are then considered over a large extension
ﬁeld. We show how to efﬁciently make use of the Frobenius endomorphism of the curve.
To this end we detail the full generalization of Koblitz’ ideas to hyperelliptic curves
showing how to compute scalar multiples using the Frobenius endomorphism and give
proofs on the properties of these expansions. We show that computing mD for m ≈
qgn needs only ≈ nqg−1
qg
group operations if  qg−12  elements can be precomputed
and stored. One can trade-off storage for larger speed-up, e.g. if one is allowed to
precompute and store  qg(qg−1)2  elements then one needs only ≈ nq
g−1
2qg operations.
As both q and g are assumed to be fairly small the storage requirements are low in
any case.
Our main emphasis in this text is on hyperelliptic curves; from the properties we
use elliptic curves are included as well. A generalization to arbitrary sub-ﬁeld curves is
obvious as the properties of the expansions depend only on the characteristic polynomial
of the Frobenius endomorphism and not on special properties of the curve. To keep
the mathematical background brief we do not mention more general curves, but all the
results presented in the sequel apply to any Picard [11] or more generally any Cab
curve (see [1,2,12]).
Our approach is different from [5,43] as our expansions are shorter and are proven
to be ﬁnite.
For elliptic curves, Koblitz [24] investigates using a Frobenius expansion as a secret
instead of an integer which is then expanded. He credits the idea to H. Lenstra. This
approach has the advantage that one saves the time (and more importantly the space
for the code) needed for the expansion. In the case of g = 1, q = 2 Solinas [47] gives
some heuristics that this approach should lead to uniformly distributed multipliers. The
idea of using such random tuples instead of random integers m was pointed out to us
by Schroeppel. We investigate the applications in protocols and consider attacks that
might be possible due to this different choice.
The paper is organized as follows. We ﬁrst recall the mathematical background
needed in the following sections and sketch the development of Koblitz curves in
cryptography. Then we present in detail the algorithms to obtain the fast method of
computing m-folds, which is analyzed in the next section. The analysis contains a care-
ful study on the length of the resulting expansions. In combination with the density
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this allows to state the complexity of computing scalar multiples using the Frobenius
endomorphism. For applications in restricted environments this might require too much
computational overhead. We analyze the effects of a different set-up and deal with
security concerns. Finally, we provide some examples to show the effects in practice and
to give evidence that the asymptotical results obtained before already apply to the used
setting.
2. Mathematical background
In this section we state results without proofs. For an introduction to hyperelliptic
curves see the appendix by Menezes et al. [38], for more details and proofs we refer
the interested reader to Lorenzini [33], Stichtenoth [49], and Frey and Lange [13].
2.1. Hyperelliptic curves and ideal class group
Let q = pr be a prime power and let Fq denote the ﬁnite ﬁeld with q elements. The
curves we consider can be deﬁned via an equation of the type
C : y2 + h(x)y = f (x), f, h ∈ Fq [x], deg f = 2g + 1, deg hg, f monic, (1)
where we require the curve to be nonsingular, i.e. no pair (x, y) ∈ F2q satisfying the
equation fulﬁlls both partial derivative equations, where Fq denotes the algebraic closure
of Fq . The curve C is called a hyperelliptic curve of genus g. In the case of odd q we
may assume that h = 0.
The group one uses is the ideal class group of a maximal order of the function ﬁeld
Fqn(x, y)/(y
2+h(x)y−f (x)), denoted by Cl(C/Fqn). For applications, it is enough to
keep the following routine in mind: take the polynomial ring Fqn [x, y] and replace any
occurrence of y2 by −h(x)y + f (x), thus every element is of the shape a(x)+ b(x)y.
The ideal class group is the factor group of the fractional ideals by the principal
ideals.
For implementations, it is necessary to have a compact representation of the group
elements. Each nontrivial ideal class can be represented via an ordered pair of polynomi-
als [u(x), v(x)], u, v ∈ Fqn [x], deg v < deg ug, u monic, that satisfy u|f − v2−hv.
To unify notation we represent the class of the principal ideals by [1, 0]. Therefore,
each class can be represented by at most 2g coefﬁcients and if one considers classes
in Cl(C/Fqm) then the coefﬁcients are in Fqm . The inverse of [u, v] equals [u,−h− v]
where the second entry is reduced modulo u, hence, computing inverses can be per-
formed efﬁciently. To need less storage for a class one can recover v from u and some
additional information (see [21,48]). In any case the key length is cng log(q) for some
small constant c depending on whether all users agree on the same curve or if the
curve has to be included in the key as well. For the group size one has
|Cl(C/Fqn)| = qng +O(qn(g−1/2)) (2)
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by the theorem of Hasse-Weil. Hence, the trade-off between group size and key length
is optimal.
By a Koblitz curve we understand a curve deﬁned over a small ﬁnite ﬁeld which
is considered over a large extension ﬁeld. More requirements on the curve for crypto-
graphic applications will be introduced later when the terminology is presented.
2.2. Frobenius endomorphism
In Fqn the Frobenius automorphism maps x to xq . This operation is inherited by the
curve and by the ideal class group as well. The Frobenius endomorphism  operates
on the ideal classes via their representatives as ([u(x), v(x)]) = [(u(x)),(v(x))]
for u, v ∈ Fq [x], where (∑ uixi) = ∑ uqi xi . It satisﬁes a characteristic polynomial
in Z[T ] of degree 2g of the form
P(T ) = T 2g + a1T 2g−1 + · · · + agT g + · · · + a1qg−1T + qg. (3)
From P one can easily obtain the group order of the ideal class group for any ﬁnite
ﬁeld extension. The complex roots i of P(T ) have the following properties: |i | = √q,
i+g = i for an appropriate ordering and the group order of the ideal class group over
Fqn is given by
|Cl(C/Fqn)| =
2g∏
i=1
(1− ni ).
To compute P(T ) it is enough to know the number of points on the curve over
Fq, . . . ,Fqg satisfying the deﬁning equation of the curve. For g = 1 we simply have
a1 = |C(Fq)| − q − 1 and for g = 2 it is a1 = |C(Fq)| − q − 1, a2 = (|C(Fq2)| −
q2− 1+ a21)/2. Hence, for curves deﬁned over small ﬁnite ﬁelds, computing the group
order poses no problem.
This is in contrast to the general case that for curves of genus >1 over ﬁelds of large
characteristic it is still inefﬁcient to determine the group order for randomly chosen
curves. For genus two curves over prime ﬁelds the current record is held by Gaudry
and Schost [18], but they need ≈ 1 week on a single machine to compute the group
order for a single curve over Fp, log2 p = 80.
2.3. Arithmetic in Cl(C/Fqn)
As usual we write the group additively. To compute scalar multiples of an element,
doublings and general additions are needed. Cantor’s algorithm [4,23] performs the
group operations on the representatives [u, v]. Recently, very efﬁcient explicit formulae
for the most frequent cases of addition and doubling were published (cf. [29] and the
references therein for g = 2 and [25,44] for g = 3). For elliptic curves such formulae
have long been known. Using the standard afﬁne representation, these formulae involve
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ﬁeld inversions in Fqn . For g = 1 and odd characteristic, an addition of ideal classes
needs 1 inversion, 2 multiplications, and 1 squaring in Fqn whereas a doubling needs
one more squaring. For g = 2 we use 1 inversion, 3 squarings, and 22 multiplications
for a generic addition and 2 more squarings for a doubling, both independent of the
characteristic. Depending on the implementation environment it can be advantageous
to trade-off the inversions for more multiplications using different coordinates.
Note that the size of the ﬁnite ﬁeld decreases with increase of g if the group size qgn
remains ﬁxed. For genus 3, qn can be represented within 64 bits for common security
requirements. This size of the ﬁnite ﬁeld can be handled advantageously by some
computers. To compare the effects for different genera one must take into account the
costs of inversions relative to multiplications to ﬁnd out for which system the arithmetic
is fastest.
3. Background on Koblitz curves
3.1. Elliptic curves over F2
The ﬁrst attempt to use the Frobenius endomorphism to speed up the computation on
an elliptic curve was made by Menezes and Vanstone [37] using the curve y2+y = x3
over F2n . The characteristic polynomial of the Frobenius is P(T ) = T 2 + 2, thus
doubling is replaced by a two-fold application of the Frobenius endomorphism and
taking the negative. However, these curves are supersingular and therefore weak [34]. As
“the next best thing” Koblitz [24] suggested to use the remaining two nonsupersingular
curves deﬁned over F2, namely y2+xy = x3+ax2+1, a ∈ {0, 1}. They are considered
as curves over F2n , where n is chosen large enough to achieve a group size of the
desired bit length. The characteristic polynomial of the Frobenius endomorphism is
P(T ) = T 2 + (−1)aT + 2.
The Frobenius endomorphism of the curve acts on a point P = (x, y) ∈ F22n of the
curve C by mapping it to (P ) = (x2, y2). If the ground ﬁeld is represented via a
normal basis this operation is virtually for free as it is realized by a cyclic shift of the
ﬁeld elements. Also for polynomial basis representations a squaring of all coordinates
is performed much faster than the whole addition formula (see [20] for a software
implementation).
Let  be a complex root of P(T ). To use the fast-to-compute endomorphism  in
computing mP for an integer m, one expands m to the base of  using the relation
2 = −(−1)a − 2. Unfortunately this direct approach leads to expansions of twice
the bit-length of m. Reﬁnements have been obtained by Meier and Staffelbach [39]
and Solinas [46]. A very detailed study can be found in Solinas [47]. To reduce the
length of these expansions for a ﬁxed extension ﬁeld F2n , one reduces m in Z[]
modulo (n − 1)/(− 1) and expands the resulting element. That is, one looks for an
element M ∈ Z[] that is equivalent to m modulo (n − 1)/( − 1) and which has a
shorter expansion. Furthermore, Solinas suggests to use a signed digit -adic expansion
achieving an expression of length n (the degree of extension) and density 13 .
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3.2. Generalizations
For larger ground ﬁelds, such subﬁeld curves have been studied by Müller [40] and
Smart [45]. In any case the ﬁeld of deﬁnition is small such that P(T ) can be computed
easily. The process of expanding is as described above, however, their studies are not
as detailed as Solinas’.
Already in his initial paper on hyperelliptic curves, Koblitz [23] suggested applying
the Frobenius endomorphism in computations of 2r -folds. Günther et al. [19] general-
ized the concept of Koblitz curves to larger genus curves and studied two curves of
genus two over F2. In [26] it has been shown that this approach works for any genus
and characteristic and this study has been detailed in [28].
4. Hyperelliptic Koblitz curves
The results of this section hold independently of the genus, characteristic, and size
of the ground ﬁeld. However, we suggest restricting to really small ﬁelds Fq , q7 and
large prime order extensions n. Additionally, we require P(T ) to be irreducible over
Z.
The size of the ground ﬁeld needs to be kept small as the number of precomputations
grows like qg . The degree of extension should be prime to get an almost prime group
order: due to |Cl(C/Fqn)| = ∏2gi=1(1 − ni ) = ∏2gi=1(1 − i )(1 + i + · · · + n−1i ) =
|Cl(C/Fq)|∏2gi=1(1 + i + · · · + n−1i ) we cannot avoid having a cofactor of size qg ,
any divisor of n will lead to additional factors. Likewise a composite P gives rise to
cofactors for any degree of extension. Furthermore, for composite or medium degree
extensions, Weil descent attacks [16,17,36] have to be taken seriously. Therefore, we
suggest to choose q and n prime for cryptographic applications. For this article we
keep the arbitrary ground ﬁeld Fq as the results are true in general.
Let |Cl(C/Fqn)| = kl for a prime l. For cryptographic applications the cofactor k
should not be signiﬁcantly larger than the inevitable factor |Cl(C/Fq)| from the ground
ﬁeld. From the Hasse–Weil bound (2) we can hope for l ≈ qg(n−1). Furthermore, we
assume that l is large such that l2|Cl(C/Fqn)|.
As supersingular curves are always weak under the Frey-Rück attack (cf. [14,15])
we suggest to avoid these curves for usual applications in DL systems. In any case
one needs to check that for the minimal  satisfying l|qn − 1 we have  > 2000
n log2 q
.
However, supersingular curves and—more generally—curves with small  can be
useful in pairing-based cryptosystems and the speed-up obtained from the Frobenius
endomorphism can be exploited there as well.
Example 1. Over F2 we can classify up to isogenies the nine classes of hyperelliptic
curves of genus 2 given by an equation of form (1) with irreducible P(T ), which are
given in Table 1.
The ﬁrst ﬁve examples were given in Koblitz [23]. Besides the ﬁrst three
classes these curves are nonsupersingular. The fourth and ﬁfth case were studied by
Günter et al. [19].
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Table 1
Binary curves of genus 2
Equation of C P(T )
y2 + y = x5 + x3 T 4 + 2T 3 + 2T 2 + 4T + 4
y2 + y = x5 + x3 + 1 T 4 − 2T 3 + 2T 2 − 4T + 4
y2 + y = x5 + x3 + x T 4 + 2T 2 + 4
y2 + xy = x5 + 1 T 4 + T 3 + 2T + 4
y2 + xy = x5 + x2 + 1 T 4 − T 3 − 2T + 4
y2 + (x2 + x)y = x5 + 1 T 4 − T 2 + 4
y2 + (x2 + x + 1)y = x5 + 1 T 4 + T 2 + 4
y2 + (x2 + x + 1)y = x5 + x T 4 + 2T 3 + 3T 2 + 4T + 4
y2 + (x2 + x + 1)y = x5 + x + 1 T 4 − 2T 3 + 3T 2 − 4T + 4
Group orders and characteristic polynomials P(T ) for all Koblitz curves of genus
4 over Fq with q7 can be found in [27].
4.1. Expansions to the Base of 
Like before let P(T ) denote the characteristic polynomial of the Frobenius en-
domorphism and let  be one of its complex roots. To make use of the Frobenius
endomorphism we need to be able to represent mD as a linear combination of the
i (D) with bounded coefﬁcients. This is equivalent to expanding m to the base of  as
m =∑li=0 rii , where the ri ∈ R for a set of coefﬁcients R to be deﬁned later. If one
precomputes rD for all occurring coefﬁcients r ∈ R then the computation of mD is
realized by applications of the Frobenius endomorphism, table-look-ups and additions
of ideal classes whenever the coefﬁcient is nonzero.
The elements of Z[] are of the form c = c0 + c1+ · · · + c2g−12g−1 with ci ∈ Z.
By (3),  satisﬁes a polynomial of degree 2g with constant term qg . Thus one can
replace the computation of qgD by qgD = −(qg−1a1(D) + qg−2a22(D) + · · · +
agg(D) + · · · + a12g−1(D) + 2g(D)). But this need not be faster than comput-
ing qgD by the usual method of double-and-add. Still it is the clue observation used
in expanding an integer. To compute the expansion we need a division by  with
remainder.
Lemma 2. c = c0+c1+· · ·+c2g−12g−1 ∈ Z[] is divisible by  if and only if qg|c0.
Proof. |c ⇔
c = c˜ = (c˜0 + c˜1+ · · · + c˜2g−12g−1)
= c˜0+ c˜12 + · · · + c˜2g−22g−2 − c˜2g−1(qg + a1qg−1+ · · · + a12g−1)
= −c˜2g−1qg + c1+ · · · + c2g−12g−1 ⇔ qg|c0. 
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Accordingly the set of coefﬁcients R must include a complete set of remainders
modulo qg to allow an expansion. Since taking the negative of a class is essentially for
free we will use R = {0,±1,±2, . . . ,± qg−12 } as minimal set of remainders. Note
that we would not need to include −qg/2 in the case of even characteristic. But as we
get it for free we will make use of it.
We now derive a -adic expansion of m ∈ Z. Put r0 ≡ m mod qg for r0 ∈ R, d1 =
(m − r0)/qg , r1 ≡ −d1a1qg−1 mod qg for r1 ∈ R, and d2 = (−d1a1qg−1 − r1)/qg .
Then
m = r0 +m− r0 = r0 + d1qg
= r0 − d1(qg−1a1+ qg−2a22 + · · · + agg + · · · + a12g−1 + 2g)
= r0 + (−d1qg−1a1 − d1qg−2a2− · · · − d1agg−1 − · · · − d1a12g−2 − d12g−1)
= r0 + r1+ (d2qg − d1qg−2a2− · · · − d1agg−1 − · · · − d1a12g−2 − d12g−1)
= r0 + r1+ 2(. . .).
The expansions derived by repeatedly applying this process with minimal remainders
|ri | qg−12  might become periodic in some cases. We study this question in Sec-
tion 4.3. In the following algorithm we assume that R has been chosen to contain
a complete set of remainders and some further coefﬁcients if necessary. Furthermore,
later on in the text we shall impose conditions to achieve a sparse representation and
therefore we will use different choices of the set of coefﬁcients R depending on the
structure of P(T ).
Now we state the algorithm for expanding an element of Z[] to the base of .
Note that at the moment we would only need to represent integers, but in the further
sections we will reduce the length of the representation. Thereby we stumble over this
more general problem:
Algorithm 1.
INPUT: c = c0 + c1+ · · · + c2g−12g−1, P(T ), a suitable set R.
OUTPUT:r0, . . . , r−1 with c =
∑−1
i=0 rii , ri ∈ R.
(1) Put i := 0;
(2) While for any 0j2g − 1 there exists an cj = 0 do
if qg|c0 choose ri := 0;
else choose ri ∈ R with qg|c0 − ri ;
/*possibly taking into account further requirements/*
/*in even characteristic choose ri = c0 if |c0| = qg/2/*
d := (c0 − ri)/qg;
for 0jg − 1 do
cj := cj+1 − aj+1qg−j−1d;
for 0jg − 2 do
cg+j := cg+j+1 − ag−j−1d;
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c2g−1 := −d;
i := i + 1;
(3) output (r0, . . . , ri−1).
4.2. On the ﬁniteness of the representation
We now consider the ﬁniteness of the -adic representations and establish the depen-
dence of the length on an expression involving m in case of a ﬁnite representation. We
show that for any curve the expansions are either ﬁnite or periodic and provide a way
to ﬁnd out what happens for a given individual curve and how to deal with periods.
For the original instance of elliptic Koblitz curves over F2, the ring Z[] was Eu-
clidean, this allowed an easy proof that the resulting expansion was ﬁnite. For elliptic
curves over ﬁelds F2r with small r Müller [40] shows that the remainder of the ex-
pansion decreases in each step with respect to a certain norm and then shows that
there are only ﬁnitely many elements of such a small norm and that they all allow a
ﬁnite expansion. In our more general case the number theoretic norm as the product
over all conjugates does not satisfy the Triangle inequality. Therefore, to investigate
the ﬁniteness we now consider a 2g dimensional lattice associated to the elements of
Z[].
Let 1, . . . , g be the g independent roots of P and take the set of elements
 :=



2g−1∑
j=0
cj
j
1, . . . ,
2g−1∑
j=0
cj
j
g

 : cj ∈ Z

 .
These elements form a lattice in Cg , since the sum of any two and integer multiples of
the vectors are in . Since the polynomial P is irreducible the lattice has full dimension
2g. We now investigate the norm 1 of vectors in this lattice, where the norm is given
by the usual Euclidean norm of Cg
N : (x1, . . . , xg) →
√
|x1|2 + · · · + |xg|2,
where | . | is the complex absolute value. We can also consider this lattice as a 2g
dimensional lattice over R by the usual representation of C as R2.
By abuse of notation we write N (c) for c = c0 + c1+ · · · + c2g−12g−1 and speak
of the norm of c since these vectors are parameterized by the integers c0, . . . , c2g−1.
1 There are two notions of length—the length of the -adic expansion and the norm of the vector,
which is often referred to as (Euclidean-)length in the literature. We hope not to confuse the reader and
use norm in the second case.
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Thus then N (c) reads
N (c) =
√√√√√ g∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2g−1∑
j=0
cj
j
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
Now we study the behavior of the norm of the remainders during the expansion of c.
Showing that the norm decreases down to a certain limit will be the important step to
prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3. Let C be a hyperelliptic curve of genus g and let  be a root of the charac-
teristic polynomial of the Frobenius endomorphism. Then the expansion of c = c0+c1+
· · ·+c2g−12g−1 ∈ Z[] to the base of  with coefﬁcients in R = {0,±1, . . . ,± qg−12 }
is either ﬁnite or becomes periodic.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that for elements of bounded norm the expansion cannot lead
to a remainder with larger norm than that bound. Showing that the expansion of any
element leads to a remainder of norm bounded by that constant concludes the proof.
Let N (c) < √g qg2(√q−1) (respectively <
√
g
qg+1
2(√q−1) for even characteristic). Then
using the Triangle inequality on c = r + c − r =: r + c′, c ≡ r mod qg , we get
N (c′)N (c) + N (r)N (c) + √g(qg − 1)/2 (respectively N (c) + √gqg/2) and
N (c′) = √qN (c′). Now direct calculation shows that N (c′) is bounded by the same
constant.
Since we consider a discrete lattice, the number of elements with bounded norm is
ﬁnite. Thus the expansion of these elements of bounded norm either ends after hitting
at most one time all these elements or runs into a cycle since the choice of the r—and
therefore the next element c′—is unique for given c. Hence, for these elements the
expansion is either periodic or ﬁnite.
The following two lemmata show that expanding an element c to the base of  leads
to an element c′ with N (c′)<√g qg2(√q−1) (or <
√
g
qg+1
2(√q−1) in even characteristic) after
at most 2 logq
2(√q−1)N (m)√
g
+ 1 steps concluding the proof. 
Later we shall refer to an algorithm to ﬁnd these elements of small norm and show
how to recognize periods and how to avoid them. Hence the problem is solved in
practice.
Lemma 4. Let q be odd. For every m ∈ Z[] we have a unique expansion m =∑−1
i=0 rii +m′, where ri ∈ {0,±1,±2, . . . ,± q
g−1
2 },
N (m′) < √g q
g
2(√q − 1) and 
⌈
2 logq
2(√q − 1)N (m)√
g
⌉
.
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Proof. Put m0 := m. The expansion of m to the base of  leads to
m0 = r0 +m1 = r0 + r1+m22
=
j−1∑
i=0
rii +mjj ,
where by Lemma 2 the ri ∈ {0,±1,±2, . . . ,± qg−12 } are uniquely determined.
The Triangle inequality for N leads to √qN (mj )N (mj−1) + N (rj−1)
N (mj−1)+√g qg−12 . Hence,
N (mj ) 
N (m0)+√g(qg − 1)/2∑j−1i=0 qi/2
qj/2
<
N (m0)
qj/2
+√g q
g − 1
2(√q − 1) .
If we choose j2 logq
2(√q−1)N (m0)√
g
, then N (m0)
qj/2

√
g
2(√q−1) and the claim follows.

For even characteristic we proceed similarly.
Lemma 5. Let q be even. For every m ∈ Z[] we have an expansion m =∑−1i=0 rii+
m′, where ri ∈ {0,±1,±2, . . . ,± qg2 },
N (m′) < √g q
g + 1
2(√q − 1) and 
⌈
2 logq
2(√q − 1)N (m)√
g
⌉
.
Proof. Put m0 := m. The expansion of m to the base of  leads to
m0 = r0 +m1 = r0 + r1+m22
=
j−1∑
i=0
rii +mjj ,
where the ri ∈ {0,±1,±2, . . . ,± qg2 } are given like in Algorithm 1.
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The Triangle inequality for N leads to √qN (mj )N (mj−1) + N (rj−1)
N (mj−1)+√g qg2 . Hence,
N (mj ) 
N (m0)+√gqg/2∑j−1i=0 qi/2
qj/2
<
N (m0)
qj/2
+√g q
g
2(√q − 1) .
If we choose j2 logq
2(√q−1)N (m0)√
g
then N (m0)
qj/2

√
g
2(√q−1) and the claim follows.

From the lemmata we see that the length of the expansion depends mainly on
N (m). They leave open to study the length of expansions of elements of norm less
than Kq,g := √g qg/2+1/2√q−1 .
Remark 6. For elliptic curves, Müller [40] and Smart [45] followed this approach to
give bounds on the length of the Frobenius expansions. There, the norm reads N (c)2 =
c20 − a1c0c1 + qc21 and the bounds on the remainders N (m′) = N (m′0 + m′1) from
Lemmas 4 and 5 can be translated to explicit bounds on the m′i . After at most 3 further
expansion steps the remainder is zero unless in the case of the pairs (q, a1) equal to
(5,±4) and (7,±5), where the expansion becomes periodic on input ±(q + 1)/2. The
easy way out in these cases is to include ±(q + 1)/2 in the set of coefﬁcients, using
an additional precomputation and a little further space.
For arbitrary genus, one can state the norm N explicitly in the coefﬁcients of the
polynomial P(T ) and express it in terms of the coefﬁcients c0, . . . , c2g−1. This can be
done using the symmetric functions in the i and with the help of the formulae derived
for computing the number of points on Koblitz curves in [28].
Example 7. For g = 2 we have for c = c0 + c1+ c22 + c33
N (c)2 = 2c20 − a1c0c1 + (a21 − 2a2)c0c2 − (a31 − 3(a1a2 − a1q))c0c3
+2qc21 − a1qc1c2 + (a21 − 2a2)qc1c3
+2q2c22 − a1q2c2c3
+2q3c23.
For g = 3 we have for c = c0 + c1+ c22 + c33 + c44 + c55
N (c)2 = 3c20 − a1c0c1 + (a21 − 2a2)c0c2 − (a31 − 3(a1a2 − a3))c0c3
+(a41 − 4(a21a2 − a1a3 + a2q)+ 2a22)c0c4
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−(a51 − 5(a31a2 − a21a3 − a1a22 + a1a2q + a2a3 − a1q))c0c5
+3qc21 − a1qc1c2 + (a21 − 2a2)qc1c3 − (a31 − 3(a1a2 − a3))qc1c4
+(a41 − 4(a21a2 − a1a3 + a2q)+ 2a22)qc1c5 + 3q2c22 − a1q2c2c3
+(a21 − 2a2)q2c2c4 − (a31 − 3(a1a2 − a3))q2c2c5 + 3q3c23 − a1q3c3c4
+(a21 − 2a2)q3c3c5 + 3q4c24 − a1q4c4c5 + 3q5c25.
In general N (c)2 is a quadratic form in the 2g variables c0, . . . , c2g−1. The coefﬁcient
of c2i is gq
i and of cicj , i < j is qi(q + 1 − |C(Fq)|), where  = j − i. Due to
its origin in the interpretation as Euclidean norm in a lattice, N 2 is a positive deﬁnite
quadratic form.
Experiments show that an element of norm bounded by Kq,g has an expansion of
length at most 2g + 1 or becomes periodic. We did not succeed in proving this for
arbitrary curves (see [28] for detailed study for g = 2). However, for each speciﬁc
curve one can easily determine an upper bound on the length of the expansion:
Finke and Pohst [10] provide an algorithm for ﬁnding all vectors of norm bounded
by a constant K in a lattice in Rs , respectively for ﬁnding all arrays (x0, . . . , xs−1)
for which the value of the corresponding quadratic form in s variables is less than K.
This allows to determine the complete set of elements of small norm. They prove the
following upper bound on the number of elements of norm bounded by K:
(2K1/2 + 1)
(4K + s − 1
4K
)
.
Thus for our constant Kq,g we have at most O
(
(
√
g
qg√
q−1 )
(4g−1)/2
)
vectors of small
norm. This bounds the maximal length of the expansion in the nonperiodic case, and
also the length of the period.
We use the algorithm to ﬁnd all elements of small norm for individual curves. For
each of them we compute the expansion. These experiments show that for each such
element c = c0 + · · · + c2g−12g−1 of small norm we have ci ∈ R for 1g2g −
1 and |c0|qg , and if c0 ∈ R the other coefﬁcients are fairly small. If no pe-
riods occur then every such element has an expansion of length at most 2g + 1,
thus either all ci ∈ R or the next remainder in the expansion has all coefﬁcients
in this set. Hence, the above bound is appropriate for the number of elements of
small norm, however, the expansions are by far shorter than hitting each element
once.
Together with Theorem 3 and Lemmas 4 or 5 respectively, this allows to sum up
the result in the nonperiodic case.
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Summary 1. Let P(T ) be such that no periodic expansions occur. Then the length of
the expansion of m with coefﬁcients in R is bounded by
2 logq
2(√q − 1)N (m)√
g
 + kq,g,
where kq,g is the maximal length of an element of norm < Kq,g .
Our observations and experiments stress that kq,g = 2g+ 1 is a good upper bound.
4.3. Periodic expansions
One argument that can be used in the proof of the ﬁniteness in the elliptic curve
case is that periods of length larger than one (except for a change of sign) cannot
occur since otherwise the coefﬁcients c0 and c1 would be larger than allowed. Now
we investigate in which situations periods can occur at all. For the elliptic curve case
the expansion can become cyclic only if |a1|−1 > (q−1)/2 thus for q < 14. For odd
characteristic these are just the cases where we included a further coefﬁcient. For even
characteristic it was shown in [40] by Müller that we always obtain a ﬁnite expansion
if we use the set R as given above.
For curves of larger genus the situation is a bit different. First of all—although
obvious from the experiments and motivated by the detailed example in [28] for the
genus 2 case—we have no proof how large the coefﬁcients of c with N (c) < Kq,g
can get, but we can obtain some information as well, which makes it easy to check
for periods for an individual curve.
In the following we assume that R consists of a complete set of remainders modulo
qg . For larger sets R′ similar observations hold.
The ﬁrst observation is that each element in the period must have norm less than
Kq,g as otherwise we know that the norm decreases.
4.3.1. Period length one
Assume that for a curve with P(T ) = T 2g+a1T 2g−1+· · ·+agT g+· · ·+a1qg−1T+qg
we have that
c = c0 + c1+ · · · + c2g−12g−1
= r0 ± (c0 + c1+ · · · + c2g−12g−1)
with r0 ∈ R and N (c)2 < K2q,g . Without loss of generality we assume that c0 > 0 and
therefore c0 > (qg − 1)/2 = rmax. Put d = (c0 − r0)/qg ∈ Z>0.
The rules for expanding an element lead to a system of equations
± ci = ci+1 − dai+1qg−i−1 0 ig − 1,
± ci = ci+1 − da2g−1−i g i2g − 2,
± c2g−1 = −d,
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where the signs are assumed simultaneously. If this system can be fulﬁlled for a curve
with the positive sign for (c0, c1, . . . , c2g−1) then the equations hold for the quadratic
twist of the curve with the opposite sign and the above coefﬁcient vector with alternating
signs. Thus we restrict ourselves to the case of positive sign. Inserting all equations in
the one for c0 yields
c0 = −d − da1 − · · · − dag − dag − 1q − · · · − da1qg−1,
thus c0 = dqg − d|Cl(C/Fq)|. Inserting the deﬁnition of d we obtain
r0 = −d|Cl(C/Fq)|.
Since both d and |Cl(C/Fq)| are nonnegative and r0 ∈ R the crucial part to be fulﬁlled
for either the curve or its twist is (qg − 1)/2d|Cl(C/Fq)|. Since a lower bound on
the class number is given by the Theorem of Hasse-Weil (2), q and d have to be such
that (qg − 1)/2d(√q − 1)2g , i.e. q must be small enough.
We have just shown
Theorem 8. Let C be a hyperelliptic curve over Fq of genus g. An expansion using
the set of remainders R with maximal coefﬁcient rmax can be periodic of period length
1 up to change of sign only if
rmax |Cl(C˜/Fq)|,
where C˜ is either the curve or its quadratic twist. If in this case the period starts a
some c ∈ Z[], then N (c) < Kq,g . One needs to include ±d(qg − |Cl(C˜/Fq)|) into R
for all 1drmax/|Cl(C˜/Fq)| to guarantee ﬁnite expansions.
For a given curve it is again fairly easy to check whether the expansion can run
into a cycle at all by applying the bound of Theorem 8. Furthermore, it shows which
additional coefﬁcients might have to be included in the set R. Using the algorithm
of Finke and Pohst we can compute all elements of such a small norm and expand
all these elements to the base of . This shows that not all the curves for which the
inequality of the theorem holds lead to cyclic expansions. In case this happens, we just
need to use the additionally included coefﬁcients instead of the whole period that would
follow. Thus if we choose such a curve for implementation we need to precompute
and store d more elements. Since d and q are bounded by relatively small constants,
the time for this further precomputation can be neglected.
Example 9. Put g = 2, q = 3. Among all the isogeny classes of curves with irreducible
P(T ) only P(T ) = T 4 ± 2T 3 + 2T 2 ± 6T + 9, P(T ) = T 4 ± T 3 − 2T 2 ± 3T + 9, and
P(T ) = T 4 ± 3T 3 + 5T 2 ± 9T + 9 lead to periods. The coefﬁcients to include are ±5
in the ﬁrst two cases and ±6 in the last one.
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Example 10. In the case of even characteristic the situation is even a bit more relaxed.
If we choose coefﬁcients from {0,±1, . . . ,±qg/2 − 1, qg/2} unless c0 = −qg/2 (cf.
Algorithm 1) then for all classes of curves of genus two over F2 (see Tabular 1) the
expansions are ﬁnite.
Even though we do not propose the ground ﬁeld F4 we checked all possible curves.
We run into a cycle only for P(T ) = T 4 ± 4T 3 + 9T 2 ± 16T + 16. To deal with this
we include ±10 in the set of coefﬁcients.
4.3.2. Longer periods
Here one can follow the same approach allowing more quotients di . A necessary
condition to have a period of length 2 is that
−(d0 + d1)|Cl(C/Fq)| = r0 + r1
can be fulﬁlled for r0, r1 ∈ R.
For d0 = −d1 we get r0 = −r1, i.e. the case of period length one with a change of
sign.
In the other cases we see as well, that d1 and d0 are of the same order and that
both and q have to be reasonably small. On the other hand except for d0 = −d1 = 1
this did not occur in the experiments and the same holds for periods of higher order.
Again this can be explained by the bounds on the coefﬁcients. If we have |c0| <√
qrmax and |ci | ∈ R, i1, then d0 < (√q + 1)/2 and |d1| < 1 + g + 1/√q in the
worst case.
We did not get any longer periods.
4.3.3. Different strategies
A different way to proof the ﬁniteness of such expansions can be extended from
Lesage [32]. He investigates expansions to the base , where  is a root of a quadratic
polynomial over Z and the set of remainders is of cardinality ||2, symmetric to 0. He
uses difference equations to prove the ﬁniteness and succeeds in general for the case of
nonreal roots (except some cases where one obtains periods). For a special polynomial
he computes the expected length of the expansion as well. The approach generalizes to
the kind of polynomials considered here due to the symmetry of P(T ) but again the
expressions for the general case involving the ai cannot be handled. Like before it is
possible to get bounds for an individual curve with explicit coefﬁcients.
4.4. Reducing the length of the expansion
The strategy explained so far would lead to expansions of length 2 logq m ≈ 2ng—
thus expansions that are 2g times as long as a qg-adic expansion which mitigates
the advantage of using the Frobenius. Thus, actually one does not expand m itself
but looks for an element M ∈ Z[] having a short expansion and MD = mD for all
D ∈ Cl(C/Fqn). Once we decide to use such a curve we need to ﬁx the ﬁeld Fqn ,
i.e. the degree of extension. This gives us the additional equation n = 1. (Note that
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for a ∈ Fqn we have aqn = a and the application of the Frobenius endomorphism on
the ideal classes does nothing but raising ﬁeld elements to the power of q.) Therefore,
if M ≡ m mod (n − 1) then MD = mD for D ∈ Cl(C/Fqn) and we can choose an
equivalent M with a short expansion.
Remark 11. Note that for a ﬁxed extension ﬁeld,  satisﬁes two equations. Since we
consider only irreducible polynomials P and since the constant term of P is qg = ±1,
the polynomials P(T ) and T n− 1 are co-prime. Thus their gcd over Q[T ] is one. But
we are working in Z[T ]. The ideal generated by these polynomials is a principal ideal
generated by an integer (since the gcd over Q[T ] is 1). In fact this number is equal
to the cardinality of the ideal class group over Fqn .
Namely, write P(T ) =∏2gi=1(T − i ). Then in the ideal under consideration we have
T n = 1. Transforming T → T n we have to evaluate
2g∏
i=1
(T n − ni )|T n=1 =
2g∏
i=1
(1− ni ) = |Cl(C/Fqn)|,
which is indeed the class number.
To rephrase this, modulo |Cl(C/Fqn)| these polynomials have a common linear factor.
Hence, if we consider only the cyclic group of order l, the polynomials have a common
factor T − s in Fl[T ], where l is a prime factor of |Cl(C/Fqn)|. This means that
the operation of the Frobenius endomorphism on an ideal class corresponds to the
multiplication of the ideal class by the integer s modulo l.
In the applications one usually restricts the computations to a subgroup of large prime
order. Let l||Cl(C/Fqn)| be a large prime such that l2|Cl(C/Fqn)|. Then we can even
look for elements equivalent to m modulo (n− 1)/(− 1) = n−1+ n−2+ · · ·+ + 1
as the Frobenius endomorphism cannot correspond to the identity.
In this section we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 12. Let  be a root of the characteristic polynomial P(T ) of the Frobenius
endomorphism of the hyperelliptic curve C of genus g deﬁned over Fq . Consider the
curve over Fqn and let m ∈ Z. There is an element M ∈ Z[] such that
(1) m ≡ M mod (n − 1)/(− 1)
and
(2) 2 logq 2(
√
q−1)N (M)√
g
< n+ 2g,
where N denotes the norm deﬁned in the previous section.
The proof is constructive, thus it provides a way to compute such an element M. Let
us ﬁx some notation which shall be useful for the proof and to state the algorithms.
For an element Q ∈ Q let z =nearest(Q) be the nearest integer to Q, if ambiguity
arises it is deﬁned to be the integer with the least absolute value. This can be realized
computationally by choosing z = Q − 0.5 if Q > 0 and z = Q + 0.5 else. We
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will also use nearest(.) for elements of Q[] where it is understood coefﬁcient-
wise.
Proof. In the ﬁeld Q[] one can invert elements. Thus, put Q := m(− 1)/(n− 1) ∈
Q[], so Q =∑2g−1i=0 Qii where Qi ∈ Q. For 0 i2g− 1 put zi = nearest (Qi)
and put
z :=
2g−1∑
i=0
zii and M := m− z(n − 1)/(− 1).
Thus it is easy to see that m ≡ M mod (n − 1)/(− 1). To compute the value
N (M) = N
(
m− z(
n − 1)
(− 1)
)
= N
(
n − 1
− 1
(
m(− 1)
n − 1 − z
))
we need an estimate on N (m(−1)n−1 − z) = N (Q− z).
N (Q− z) =

 g∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2g−1∑
i=0
(Qi − zi)ij
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2


1
2


 g∑
j=1

2g−1∑
i=0
|(Qi − zi)ij |


2


1
2


 g∑
j=1

1
2
2g−1∑
i=0
√
q
i


2


1
2
=

 g∑
j=1
( √
q2g − 1
2(√q − 1)
)2
1
2
= √g q
g − 1
2(√q − 1) .
Therefore we have
N (M) = N
(
n − 1
− 1
(
m(− 1)
n − 1 − z
))

n−1∑
i=0
N
((
m(− 1)
n − 1 − z
)
i
)
=
n−1∑
i=0
(√
g
qg − 1
2(√q − 1)q
i/2
)
= √g q
g − 1
2(√q − 1)
√
qn − 1√
q − 1 .
It follows that
2 logq
2(√q − 1)N (M)√
g
2 logq
(√
qn − 1√
q − 1
)
+ 2 logq(qg − 1) < n+ 2g. 
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Remark 13. The usage of nearest might not be the best choice, nevertheless it
provides an efﬁcient way to compute a length-reduced representation which works for
every genus g, ground ﬁeld Fq , and degree of extension n. For the two binary elliptic
curves, Solinas investigates in more detail an optimal way of reduction. Considering
the lattice spanned by {1, } he shows that for each element of Q[] there is a unique
lattice point within distance less than 4/7. For larger genera the computation of the
nearest point is computationally hard to realize and we do not lose much choosing the
“rounded” elements the way presented here.
Thus from the discussion of Section 4.2 we have the following result:
Theorem 14 (Main result on the length). Let C be a hyperelliptic curve over Fq of
genus g and with characteristic polynomial of the Frobenius endomorphism P(T ). Let
P be such that the -adic expansion is not periodic and that for an element c of Z[]
of norm < Kq,g the -adic expansion is no longer than 2g + 1. Then we have:
For every element m ∈ Z we can compute a -adic expansion of length  using
coefﬁcients in the set R only, where
n+ 4g + 1.
The remainder of this section is devoted to computational aspects. One ﬁrst needs
to compute (n − 1)/( − 1) and its inverse in Q[], which is done only once for
C and n. The computations are performed using recurrence sequences. To derive the
inverse in Q[] one uses the extended Euclidean algorithm. If C and n are system
parameters these elements can be computed externally and stored on the device as they
are independent of the chosen ideal classes. In Section 5 we state a way to circumvent
this, see also Remark 15.
First of all one needs the representation of (n − 1)/(− 1) in Z[].
Algorithm 2.
INPUT: n ∈ N, P(T ).
OUTPUT:e0, . . . , e2g−1 ∈ Z such that (n − 1)/(− 1) = e0 + e1+ · · · + e2g−12g−1
in Z[].
(1) initialize: d0 := 1 and di := 0 for 1 i2g − 1;
e0 := 1 and ei := 0 for 1 i2g − 1;
(2) for 1jn− 1 do
(a) dold := d2g−1;
(b) for 2g − 1 ig do
di := di−1 − a2g−idold;
ei := ei + di ;
(c) for g − 1 i1 do
di := di−1 − aiqg−idold;
ei := ei + di ;
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(d) d0 := −qgdold;
e0 := e0 + d0;
(3) output (e0, e1, ..., e2g−1).
Considering e(T ) =∑ eiT i we can invert e modulo P(T ) in Q[T ] by the extended
Euclidean Algorithm, as for gcd(e, P ) = ee′ +PP ′ one has e′ ≡ e−1 mod P . For ﬁxed
genus and hence degree of the involved polynomials, this can be made explicit.
We now present the algorithm for computing scalar multiples as a whole.
Algorithm 3 (Computation of m-folds using -adic expansions).
INPUT: m ∈ Z,D = [u, v], u, v ∈ Fqn [x], P(T ), R (appropriate set of
coefﬁcients), e = (n − 1)/(− 1), e′ ≡ e−1 mod P .
OUTPUT:mD represented by the reduced ideal H = [s, t], s, t ∈ Fqn [x].
(1) /*precomputation*/
(a) for i ∈ R, i > 0 compute
D(i) := iD; /* use double-and-add and previous computations*/
D(−i) := −D(i);/* for free, can also be computed from D(i)
when used*/
(2) /*compute m modulo (n − 1)/(− 1) using e and e′*/
(a) compute z(T ) :=nearest(m · e′(T ));
(b) let M =∑2g−1i=0 MiT i :≡ m− e(T ) · z(T ) mod P(T );
(3) /*compute the -adic representation of M */
use Algorithm 1 to compute expansion of M =∑−1j=0 rjj ;
(4) /* compute m-fold of D;*/
(a) initialize H := D(r−1);
(b) for − 2 i0 do
(i) H := (H); /* this means cyclic shifting*/
(ii) if ri = 0 then
H := H +D(ri); /* one table-look-up, one addition*/
(c) output (H).
Step 1 needs to be performed only once per curve and base-point D, so in some
applications one saves the precomputed points on the device and skips this step.
Remark 15. Arithmetic in Q has high system requirements. Therefore, for binary el-
liptic curves, Solinas [47] proposes partial modular reduction. Instead of computing
M ∈ Z[] of minimal norm he obtains an element M ′ ≡ m mod (n−1)/(−1) which
might have a slightly longer expansion but the computations involve only truncated
divisions by powers of 2 which can easily be realized in soft- and hardware. For the
particular curves he considers one can explicitly state the group order as an expression
of the degree of extension n and therefore ﬁnd appropriate denominators giving a good
approximation.
In our general case this is not possible, but one can work with an arbitrary good
approximation e˜′ of e′ in which all denominators are powers of two. The idea of Solinas
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to use the number theoretic norm can be generalized to computing
(1 − 1)
(n1 − 1)
=
2g∏
i=1
(i − 1)
(ni − 1)
2g∏
i=2
(ni − 1)
(i − 1) = (kl)
−1
2g∏
i=2
(ni − 1)
(i − 1) .
Thus, one can also precompute a Barrett-inversion of kl and get the inversion by
multiplications and modular reductions.
Note that in any case the resulting M˜ will still be in the same class as m since
M˜ = m− (n − 1)/(− 1)·nearest
(∑2g−1
i=0 me˜′ii
)
≡ m mod (n − 1)/(− 1).
4.5. Complexity and comparison
The estimates for the complexity are given as number of group operations. Using
precomputations as suggested one only needs to use additions. If the elements are
represented with respect to a normal basis then (D) can be computed for free. Thus
we ignore these operations in the following.
By Theorem 14 the length of a -adic expansions is normally bounded by n+4g+1
in the nonperiodic case. Furthermore, the experiments show that even a bound of n+4
is sufﬁcient for the range of q and g considered here.
The second important characteristic for the complexity is the density  of the expan-
sion. By density we mean the number of nonzero coefﬁcients divided by the number
of coefﬁcients. Thus  times the length gives the number of additions needed.
We ﬁrst consider the minimal set R = {0,±1, . . . ,±qg/2}. A zero-coefﬁcient
occurs with probability 1/qg , therefore the asymptotic density is (qg − 1)/qg < 1.
Certainly all usual (signed) windowing methods carry through to -adic windows, thus
if one precomputes all multiples r0D + r1(D) + · · · + rw−1w−1(D), ri ∈ R, r0 = 0
the density reduces to (qwg − 1)/(wqwg) on average for ﬁxed windows and to even
less for sliding ones. Thus one can trade-off storage for larger speed-up. Depending on
the curve one can also use other sets of coefﬁcients, see [19,28] for details.
These numbers need to be compared to the usual arithmetic. Using binary double-
and-add the number of operations is 32 log2m ∼ 32gn log2 q and using a NAF of m it
still is ∼ 43gn log2 q.
Summary 2. If we disregard storage and time for precomputations and assume a -
adic expansion of length ≈ n+ 2g + 1, the speed-up factor is approximately
3gqg log2 q
2(qg − 1) > 1.5g
compared to the binary expansion and
4gqg log2 q
3(qg − 1) > 1.3g
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Table 2
g Binary -adic,w = 1 Speed-up Binary -adic, w = 2 Speed-up factor
window factor window
2 11/4n 3/4n 11/3 31/12n 3/7n 217/36 ∼ 6
3 31/8n 7/8n 31/7 573/160n 7/15n 1719/224 ∼ 7.6
4 79/16n 15/16n 79/15 1023/224n 15/31n 10571/1120 ∼ 9.4
Table 3
g wbin Binary -adic, w = 1 Speed-up wbin Binary -adic, w = 2 Speed-up
window factor window factor
2 4 47/8n 24/25n 6 9 6n 24/49n 12
3 7 511/64n n 8 13 8n 124/249n 16
4 9 10n n 10 18 10n 1/2n 20
compared to the NAF expansion, both for the minimal set of coefﬁcients and for n
large compared to g and q.
Precomputations and signed digit expansions cannot be taken into account in a general
formula, as it is a bit tricky to allow the same number of precomputations. We state
q = 2 and 5 as examples allowing windows of length at most 2. Tables 2 and 3 list
the average number of group operations to compute a scalar multiple using a signed
digit windowing method and using the Frobenius endomorphism. For q = 2 and w = 1
the corresponding binary system is allowed to use a window of width g, for w = 2 a
width of 2g − 1 is more than fair.
For q = 5 we cannot directly express the width wbin for the binary method as a
function in g, thus we include this parameter in the table. Entries may be rounded to
nearest integer.
4.6. Disadvantages
So far we have seen how to speed up the computation of m-folds on Koblitz curves.
Certainly an attacker can also make use of the Frobenius endomorphism—ﬁrst of all
to speed up his computations. Furthermore, algorithms like Pollard’s rho method allow
to consider equivalence classes under the Frobenius endomorphism as “one element”
(see [8,50] as the concepts generalize to hyperelliptic curves easily). This leads to a
speed-up by a factor of
√
n for Pollard’s method. Thus allowing slightly larger ﬁeld
extensions n is enough to deal with this potential weakness.
The choice of Koblitz curves implies that one needs precomputations unless g =
1, q = 2 to obtain the described performance. Furthermore, to reduce the length of the
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expansions we use polynomial arithmetic over Q which as well restricts the applications.
We consider these two points in more detail in the next section.
5. Alternative set-up
For a cryptosystem or protocol based on Koblitz curves we now suggest to start with
an expansion of ﬁxed length and use this as the secret scalar—not caring to which
integer it corresponds if at all. This implies that the device need not be able to perform
polynomial arithmetic and to deal with arithmetic both in ﬁnite ﬁelds and in Q.
If—as usual—we restrict ourselves to D of prime order l, we work in a cyclic group
and  operates as a group automorphism. Then for the action of the Frobenius we have
(D) = sD, where s is an integer modulo l (see Remark 11). Hence, any sum∑−1i=0 rii
corresponds to an integer modulo l, namely to
∑−1
i=0 risi mod l, and one can replace
the whole procedure to choose random integers and compute a reduced expansion
described above by choosing a random -tuple of coefﬁcients ri ∈ R. The integer s is
obtained via gcd(P (T ), T n−1 + · · · + T + 1) = (T − s) in Fl[T ]. This computation is
done only once and s is included in the curve parameters. Here, we use the minimal
set R = {0,±1, . . . ,± qg−12 } in odd characteristic and R = {0,±1, . . . ,±( q
g
2 − 1), q
g
2 }
in even characteristic to avoid ambiguity. We assume that the chosen curve fulﬁlls all
requirements listed in the previous sections.
Remark 16. Likewise we can use the enlarged sets R of size qg(qg − 1) and impose
conditions on the density to obtain sequences (r0, . . . , r−1) resembling outputs of the
reduction and expansion procedure. Obviously, this leads to faster computations but it
requires more precomputed points. We skip the details as most considerations are very
similar.
By a random expansion of length  we mean a tuple r = (r0, . . . , r−1) with ri
chosen randomly in R along with the interpretation as r0 + r1 + · · · + r−1−1. We
will show that a reasonable choice is  = n− 1.
We ﬁrst consider applications of this modiﬁed set-up and then investigate security
issues.
5.1. Applications of the alternative set-up
We now care about the practicability of these new keys and show that we can still
use the standard protocols:
In the Difﬁe–Hellman key-exchange [7] and in the ElGamal cryptosystem [9] all
scalar multiplications can be performed using the random tuples. It is likewise possible
that only one user applies the new idea whereas the other uses the standard Koblitz
curve techniques or a binary expansion.
As signature scheme we choose an inversion-free scheme. However, the same con-
siderations hold for any signature scheme. (For an overview of applicable schemes
consider the Handbook of Applied Cryptography [35][Note 11.70].) Let H(.) and h(.)
T. Lange / Finite Fields and Their Applications 11 (2005) 200–229 223
be hash functions from the message space resp. from the ﬁrst polynomial of an ideal
class to the integers modulo the group order l. The hash functions are public. A secretly
chooses a and publishes EA = aD. To sign a message m, she chooses a nonce k and
sends 	(k) = kD and 
(k,m) ≡ aH(m) + kh(kD) mod l together with the message
m. To check the validity one compares 
D and H(m)EA + h(	)	 and accepts upon
equality. As one can see, the secret numbers a, k are not only used as multipliers but
also as integers modulo l. As such they can be recovered using the correspondence of
 and s. To compute k as an integer k˜, we need at least − 2 multiplications modulo
l plus some additions for the coefﬁcients. Note, that we can compute k˜ and kD on
the run as we need not store the coefﬁcients and start from the highest power of s
or  respectively. Thus, we take  random elements r of R and each time compute
the intermediate results (	˜) + rD and sk˜ + r mod l from the previous intermediate
results 	˜ and k˜. Usually this can be performed faster than computing the expansion as
presented in Section 4. To obtain a we proceed the same way, but we save a together
with its expansion.
5.2. Collisions
To apply the idea described in the previous section, we need to ensure that the
corresponding multipliers occurring as integers modulo l are equally distributed. Re-
spectively, we need to be aware of collisions. Since we know that sn ≡ 1 mod l, because
s corresponds to the Frobenius endomorphism on this restricted group, and s ≡ 1 mod l
the highest exponent of  in the expansion should be less or equal to n− 2, to avoid
multiple occurrences of a number. There can be other combinations of powers of s
with bounded coefﬁcients depending on the chosen curve, but here we try to exclude
those polynomials that occur in any case. Namely, note that the known equivalences
1+s+· · ·+sn−1 ≡ 0 mod l and s2g+a1s2g−1+· · ·+agsg+· · ·+a1qg−1s+qg ≡ 0 mod l
do not lead to such a representation, since in the ﬁrst one the highest power is n− 1
and all powers si mod l, 0 in−2 are different and also not equal to the negative of
another power (n is an odd prime), the second one contains the coefﬁcient qg ∈ R, and
any combination of both still has the maximal power of n−1 or too large coefﬁcients.
A mathematical sound study of collisions for these curves can be found in [31] showing
that for l large enough collisions do not or only rarely occur for  = n− 1.
5.3. Attacks
We now investigate extra weaknesses imposed by applying a random tuple instead
of the expansion of a random integer. The obvious difference is that actual expansions
are some -adic digits longer than the tuples. The standard low-storage square-root
algorithms for computing discrete logarithms cannot make use of the fact that the last
digits of the base  expansion of the multiplier are zero. Clearly, a brute-force search
throughout the key-space can make use of the reduced amount of possible keys, but
this is far too inefﬁcient to be threat. One can design a -adic baby-step-giant-step
algorithm which slightly reduces the security but usually the storage requirements are
prohibitively large. To play safe one should increase n by some bits.
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If we consider digital signatures we have to pay more attention. We ﬁrst outline what
happens if parts of the binary expansion of the nonces are known and then show that
this attack does not apply for our case. Building upon [3,22], Nguyen and Shparlinski
[41] invented a way to reveal the secret signing key a if only some bits of the nonces
k are known. They apply it to signature schemes based on the multiplicative group
of a ﬁnite ﬁeld and on elliptic curves. Although our notation and signature scheme
differ from the one presented in [41], we now present essentially their ideas, however,
in the new context of ideal class groups. Then we investigate to which extend this
can be generalized to -adic bits. Let xl denote the unique integer 0x < l with
x ≡ x mod l.
The task of computing a is transformed to a hidden number problem, which can
be solved by lattice reduction. Assume that the highest j bits of k are known, i.e. one
knows k′ such that 0k − k′ =  < l/2j , where as before l denotes the prime group
order. As aH(m) ≡ 
(k,m) − kh(kD) ≡ 
(k,m) − (k′ + )h(kD) mod l, the attacker
can compute
T (k,m) ≡ h(kD)−1H(m) mod l, U(k,m) ≡ −k′ + 
(k,m)h(kD)−1 mod l
from the publicly knows values and gets the problem of ﬁnding a such that
U(k,m)− aT (k,m)l < l/2j .
This hidden number problem can be solved given that one receives enough instances,
i.e. different values of k and m for ﬁxed a and equal most signiﬁcant part of k, and
that the nearest vector problem in the associated lattice can be solved (this is likely as
the dimension is relatively low). Shparlinski and Nguyen verify this experimentally for
elliptic curves and succeed even for a small number of known bits as j = 3. There
are no reasons to expect a different behavior for larger genus curves. Hence, the attack
has to be taken seriously.
Using our alternative scheme, the attacker knows that the “most signiﬁcant -adic
bits” of k are zero, respectively, as the corresponding integer s is easy to compute, that
the highest powers of s do not occur. On the other hand we can bound s as an integer
from below:
We have that P(s) ≡ 0 mod l. This equation cannot hold in the integers since we
assume P to be irreducible. Hence, s2g+a1s2g−1+· · ·+agsg+· · ·+a1qg−1s+qg l.
Neglecting lower order terms s2g + O(s2g−1) l ⇒ s(1 + O(1))l1/2g ≈ q(n−1)/2.
Therefore, s is large and in the expression k =∑n−2i=0 risi one in fact computes modulo
l. So, the attack does not carry through directly as one only knows that modulo l the
highest coefﬁcients are zero.
Techniques to solve subset sum problems [6,42] show that one can also deal with
modular congruences by increasing the dimension by one and adding a further co-
ordinate to stand for the unknown multiple of l. They show that for subset sums∑t
i=1 idi , i ∈ {0, 1} out of t elements di modulo an integer l the secret coefﬁcients
can be determined for t/ log2 l < 0.94. That setting allows only coefﬁcients in {0, 1}.
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To model larger coefﬁcients rmax one includes 2di, 22di, . . . , 2log2 rmaxdi in the set
for each di . If rmax is not a power of 2 one needs to take into account that not all
linear combinations of these additional numbers are allowed but this does not affect the
procedure. This enlarges t by a factor of ≈ log2 rmax. Allowing negative signs works
just the same.
In our case l is the group order, i.e. l ≈ qg(n−1). The di are the distinct powers si
of s modulo l. Therefore the set contains t = 2(n−1) log2(qg/2) ≈ (n−1)g log2 q
elements. The fraction t/ log2 l is very close to 1—for the approximations detailed
above it even equals 1. In general, one should check that t/ log2 l > 0.94 before
applying a curve.
6. Example
In this section we present one example, however, further good instances are easy to
get [27]. Consider the binary curve of genus 2 given by
C : y2 + (x2 + x + 1)y = x5 + x + 1
with characteristic polynomial of the Frobenius endomorphism P(T ) = T 4 − 2T 3 +
3T 2 − 4T + 4. For the extension of degree 89 the class number is almost prime
|Cl(C/F289)| = 2 · 191561942608242456073498418252108663615312031512914969.
Let l be the large prime number. The operation of  on the group of order l corre-
sponds to the multiplication by
s = −109094763598619410884498554207763796660522627676801041 mod l
For a high-level comparison we provide two Magma programs. The program for
this curve FrobExample and a program to play around with a user-deﬁned curve
FrobSelf can be obtained from [27]. A detailed paper about implementation of
hyperelliptic Koblitz curves using normal and polynomial bases in comparison is in
preparation [30]. It gives evidence that the theoretic and asymptotic results of this paper
actually hold true in practice.
7. Conclusion
We gave details on the use of Koblitz curves and presented an alternative set-up in
which the random integer m is replaced by a random n − 1 tuple of elements from
R. This alternative set-up allows to save the time needed to compute the expansion.
Furthermore, in this case the mathematical features needed are reduced to a minimum,
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e.g. no arithmetic in Q is used. Hence, this set-up is especially appropriate for memory-
constrained environments like smart cards. The devices of the participants need only
be able to perform addition, to execute , and to randomly choose elements from R.
A little amount of storage is required to keep precomputed multiples.
The proposed alternative set-up can be applied to the usual protocols where in
the case of a signature scheme one needs to compute the secret multiple as an in-
teger as well. Concerning security issues, we considered generalizations of known
attacks and dealt with collisions. To conclude one can say that using this modi-
ﬁed system saves the time needed to compute the expansion without weakening the
system.
An extremely careful user might feel better to use it only for ElGamal and
Difﬁe–Hellman although to our knowledge signature schemes are just as well
secure.
Remark 17. (1) In this paper we considered the effects of known -adic bits only in
the section on the alternative set-up. The same considerations hold true for side-channel
attacks where the leakage allows to obtain some -adic bits. Our analysis shows that
Koblitz curve systems are not vulnerable to such attacks if the number of leaked bits
is small, such that the parameter t in Section 5.3 is close to 1.
We thank the anonymous referee for pointing out this observation.
(2) One can restrict the key size even more by choosing a smaller set of coefﬁ-
cients for the -adic expansion. This reduces the storage requirements and the proba-
bility of collisions but for extreme choices—like R′ = {0,±1}, g, q > 2, thus without
precomputations—one has to be aware of lattice based attacks on the subset sum prob-
lem [6,42]. If one tries to get around these by using longer keys of length n + ,
collisions get more likely since one has to deal with 1 + s + · · · + sn−1 ≡ 0 mod l.
Then the zero element occurs at least 2
(+r ′max−1
r ′max
)+1 times, where r ′max is the maximal
coefﬁcient of R′. Another idea is to consider only sparse representations to reduce the
complexity. Although this reduces the size of the key-space as well, the implications
are less dramatic.
(3) The use of reduced -expansions may help to improve any cryptographic method
of key-exchange, signing and encryption based on the Jacobian of curves or other
Abelian varieties which are deﬁned over a smaller ﬁeld than they are considered. In-
cluded are for example Jacobians of superelliptic and Cab-curves and one might apply
the construction to other efﬁciently computable endomorphisms with known character-
istic polynomial.
(4) Unless P(T ) = T 2g + qg , the standard method as well as the alternative set-up
can be applied to speed up pairing schemes based on supersingular curves, as pointed
out by Stein.
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